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THE FORCE OF A LEGAL CONCEPT:




The Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan was met with acclamation perhaps almost as widespread among
scholars as journalists.2 For the first time, the Court accorded
constitutional recognition to defamatory speech. 3 In particular, the
ruling's newly minted "actual malice" standard barred public officials
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to their
official conduct unless they showed that the defendant either knew the
statement was false or acted with reckless disregard of whether it was
false.4 Further stiffening this formidable evidentiary obstacle was the
requirement that an official establish actual malice with "convincing
* John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University
College of Law. I would like to thank Vincent Blasi, Ronald Cass, and Ashley
Messenger for helpful thoughts and conversations. I would also like to thank the
First Amendment Law Review for sponsoring the symposium on the fiftieth
anniversary of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, at which a preliminary version of
this article was presented.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Harry Kalven famously quoted Alexander Meiklejohn as pronouncing the
decision "an occasion for dancing in the streets." Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York
Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup.
CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125.
3. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (repudiating the
proposition that libel enjoys "talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations").
Before Sullivan, the Supreme Court had regarded defamation as unworthy of First
Amendment protection. For the first time, the Court accorded constitutional
recognition to defamatory speech. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
256-57 (1952) (stating in dictum that libelous statements "are of such slight social
value . . . that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality"); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
4. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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clarity" rather than by mere preponderance of the evidence.5 However
daunting this requirement, it is consonant with the "central meaning of
the First Amendment"6 that Sullivan conferred this potent safeguard on
speech at the heart of democratic self-government.7 Such a robust hurdle
to recovery encouraged citizens to criticize government authorities
without fear of repercussion,8 and was congruent with the privilege
enjoyed by public officials against whom private citizens brought suit. 9
In the years after Sullivan, however, the Court extended the
actual malice standard to areas that-with one exception'o-did not
directly implicate either of these rationales, i.e., the need to insulate
government critics from retaliation or the symmetry of speech rights
between public officials and citizens. This Article discusses instances of
this phenomenon, highlighting in each case how the Court was not
necessarily compelled to import the actual malice standard into a
different context. While the requirement's spread to new settings is now
established, it was not inevitable. Given the existence of plausible
alternatives, this Article considers what dangers may lurk in the repeated
transplantation of this nearly insuperable evidentiary barrier" to
scenarios detached from its origin in Sullivan.
5. Id. at 285-86.
6. Id. at 273.
7. See id. at 270 (declaring "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); see also
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) ("Criticism of government is at the very
center of the constitutionally protected area of free discussion."); THOMAS 1.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970) (including provision
for participation in decision-making by all members of society among principal
functions of First Amendment).
8. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted) ("A rule
compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual
assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-
leads to ... self-censorship.").
9. Id. at 282.
10. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (requiring
demonstration of actual malice in defamation actions seeking criminal sanction).
11. See 33 A.L.R.4th 212 (1984) ("[1]t is obviously extremely difficult for the
private individual suing in defamation to establish actual malice, as can be seen from
the general lack of success of defamation actions in cases where the actual malice
standard is imposed on private individuals suing media defendants."); David A.
Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel Litigation,
87 VA. L. REV. 503, 509-10 (2001) (reporting study of defamation and related
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11. BEYOND PUBLIC OFFICIALS:
THE VARIED DEPLOYMENT OF THE ACTUAL MALICE REQUIREMENT
A review of cases adopting the Sullivan standard suggests the
appeal of a powerful and increasingly familiar concept. To some extent,
actual malice apparently becomes convenient shorthand for the impulse
to protect a particular type of speech. Though the impulse is generally
laudable, one can question whether this particular requirement was finely
tailored to the balance of constitutional and governmental interests at
stake in each instance. It seems doubtful that if the actual malice standard
had not already existed, the Court would have devised that precise test to
serve the First Amendment values implicated in each case.
A. Extending the Actual Malice Shield to Other Libel Defendants
The Court's willingness to stretch Sullivan's protection to
situations well beyond the circumstances of that case became manifest
just three years after Sullivan. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,12 the
Court extended the actual malice rule to speech pertaining to
nongovernmental plaintiffs who qualified as "public figures."13 In his
decisive concurrence,14 Chief Justice Earl Warren declared artificial a
stark dichotomy between public officials and private individuals, since
many persons outside of government exercise power and influence
comparable to that of officeholders.' 5 Thus, Sullivan's standard should
apply as well to people who are "intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in
areas of concern to society at large."16 Application of the actual malice
claims filed against "media defendants" finding that claims brought by plaintiffs
who were public figures or public officials incurred pretrial dismissal rate of 85%,
compared to 68% for private figures).
12. 389 U.S. 28 (1967). The Court issued a similar decision in a companion
case, Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
13. Id. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
14. The holding in Butts rested on a somewhat complex set of alignments. For
a description, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment:
Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 275-78.
15. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
16. Id. at 163-64.
451
452 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
rule to such individuals, he reasoned, would serve to safeguard the
public's right to "be informed on matters of legitimate interest."17
Though grounded in reasonable observation, Warren's
conception of public figures subject to the same scrutiny as public
officials was not the only way to address the outsized influence wielded
by nominally private individuals. The Court could have adhered to
Sullivan's overriding focus on unimpeded criticism of public officials as
crucial to sustaining democratic self-government. A standard constructed
from this perspective would not have fully equated libel of public figures
with false statements about the performance of a public official. After all,
while a well-known actor 8 or famous professional athlete' 9 may qualify
as a public figure, the basis for that designation has little relation to
democratic accountability. Thus, for example, a more calibrated
approach could have recognized public figures as a category warranting a
heightened evidentiary standard without raising the plaintiffs burden to
20
the forbidding actual malice requirement. Conversely, the Court might
have allowed public figures to prevail on a showing of negligence like
other formally private individuals, but placed special limitations on the
damages to which they are entitled.
A few years after Butts, the Court-for a time 2 '-greatly
expanded the reach of the Sullivan standard by untethering the actual
malice rule from the identity of the plaintiff. In Rosenbloom v.
22 . . 23
Metromedia, Inc., Justice Brennan's plurality opinion extended the
rule's application to encompass all defamatory falsehoods concerning
17. Id. at 164-65.
18. See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2002).
19. See Pippen v. NBC Universal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir.
2013).
20. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 155 (Harlan, J., plurality) (proposing that public
figures be required to show "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by
responsible publishers").
21. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
22. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
23. See id. at 31-32 (Brennan, J., plurality) (affirming lower court decision
that the New York Times actual malice standard applies to private individuals
involved in a public event). As in Butts, Rosenbloom's holding comprised an overlap
of differing opinions.
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"matters of public or general concern" 24 without regard to the plaintiffs
25
status2. In practice, the criterion that libelous speech be of public or
general concern or "interest" 26 proved almost redundant when news
reports were at issue; lower courts overwhelmingly found matters
- 27 .
receiving media coverage to constitute this type of expression. This
regime strayed even further from Sullivan's roots in solicitude for
criticism of public authorities than Butts. Attempting to equate their
ruling to Sullivan, Warren and other Justices in Butts analogized the
28
impact of public figures to that of public authorities. Under
Rosenbloom, plaintiffs might face the usually impossible task of showing
actual malice simply because they happened to be involved in a matter
that the media found newsworthy.29 The adoption of the actual malice
standard so far from its base and so sweeping in scope virtually invited
reconsideration by the Court.
When that moment arrived in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,30 the
Court overturned the Rosenbloom plurality's expansive standard31 and
restored a status-based approach to defamatory falsehoods. With Gertz,
24. Id. at 44.
25. See id. (stating that the protection applies to both famous and anonymous
persons).
26. Id. at 42-43.
27. See David W. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise
of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 206 & n.50 (1976) (finding that
only 6 of over 100 reported decisions making this determination clearly concluded
that the alleged defamatory publication or broadcast did not address matters of
public interest).
28. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text; see also Butts, 388 U.S. at
155 (Harlan, J., plurality) (indicating that libel plaintiffs could be characterized as
public figures either because they had attained a position that inherently commands
public interest, or because they had thrust their personality "into the 'vortex' of an
important public controversy") (citation omitted).
29. See, e.g., Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43 (Brennan, J., plurality) ("If a matter
is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely
because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did
not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved."); Gospel Spreading Church v.
Johnson Publ'g Co., 454 F.2d 1050, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (requiring plaintiff
church to meet actual malice standard because church's activities in real estate and
religious tax exemption field were of "'public or general concern"' (quoting
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44-45 (Brennan, J., plurality))).
30. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
31. Id. at 345-46.
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the actual malice requirement for any liability was again limited to public
officials and public figures; plaintiffs deemed private figures would not
have to demonstrate actual malice to recover actual damages.32 This
ruling sharply contracted the actual malice rule's protective cloak, for
private figure designation became the default status, i.e., all plaintiffs
except those who were classified as public officials or public figures.
States were now authorized to allow these individuals to obtain damages
for harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood simply upon a showing of
negligence.3 4 Even as the Court reduced First Amendment protection for
defamatory expression, however, it declined to abandon the actual malice
standard as a tool for adjusting the competing interests at stake. Rather,
Gertz held that proof of negligence could secure only actual damages; a
showing of actual malice was still required for awards of presumed or
. 35punitive damages.
Even when the Court later sought to refine defamation doctrine
with greater regard to Sullivan's underlying theme, and thereby further
diminish protection for libel, it retained a substantial place for the actual
malice rule. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 3 the
Court announced that Gertz's framework applied only to defamation of
private individuals on matters of public concern. In the absence of a
public concern, Justice Powell's plurality opinion explained that the
comparative weight of the interests involved required a different
standard.3 8 In discussing the importance and meaning of speech
involving a public concern, Justice Powell repeatedly invoked Sullivan.
For example, he recalled Sullivan's emphasis that "'debate on public
32. Id. at 347.
33. The Gertz Court described two alternative bases for treating a libel plaintiff
as a public figure: "achiev[ing] such pervasive fame or notoriety that [the individual]
becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts," or injecting oneself or
becoming drawn into "a particular public controversy" such that the individual
"becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Id. at 351.
34. Id. at 347.
35. Id. at 349.
36. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
37. Id. at 751, 756 (Powell, J., plurality). In yet another splintered decision,
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Justice Powell's opinion, while Chief
Justice Burger and Justice White concurred in the judgment. The concurring Justices
agreed with Justice Powell's characterization of Gertz's application. Id. at 764, 774.
38. Id. at 756-61 (Powell, J., plurality).
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issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"' 39 and cited
Sullivan's pronouncement that that the First Amendment "was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."40 Where this core
purpose was not implicated, states could license private figures to
recover presumed and punitive damages upon a showing of negligence.4'
Thus, the Dun & Bradstreet decision shrank the reach of the actual
malice rule, but left intact its operation in suits involving public officials,
public figures, and private figures seeking presumed or punitive
damages.
B. Actual Malice's Impact Outside ofLibel
Defamation is not the only common law tort whose force has
been eroded by the constraint of the actual malice rule. The Court has
also found the Sullivan standard relevant to defenses against false light
claims42 and actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress.43 in
neither instance did the case that occasioned expanded First Amendment
protection directly or indirectly involve a public official.
The Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill4 contributed to the
long decline of false light doctrine.45 The case arose from a magazine
article about a play that drew on the ordeal of plaintiff Hill and his family
46as hostages of escaped convicts. Though the play had altered significant
aspects of the incident,4 7 the magazine's account "'portrayed [the play]
39. Id. at 755 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270) (emphasis added by Powell,
J.).
40. Id. at 759 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269) (inner citation and quotation
marks omitted).
41. See id. at 763.
42. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
43. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
44. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
45. See generally J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 783 (1992); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of
Privacy: The Light that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364 (1989).
46. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 377.
47. Most notably, both the suffering and heroism of the family in the play
exceeded that of the Hills. Id. at 377-78.
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as a re-enactment of the Hills' experience."'48 Nullifying Hill's damage
award, the Court ruled that recovery of damages for "false reports of
matters of public interest" required proof that the defendant published the
report with actual malice. 4 9 As in Rosenbloom, the Court's "public
interest,,50 touchstone appeared to cover much formerly actionable
speech, now likely to be thwarted by an unfeasible burden of proof. And
as in Rosenbloom, the subject matter of the suit was quite distant from
the criticism of public officials' performance that animated Sullivan's
ruling.5'
Like false light claims, the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IED) was drained of much potency when the actual
malice rule was inserted. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,52 the
Court reviewed an award of damages for IED to Jerry Falwell, a
"nationally known minister who has been active as a commentator on
politics and public affairs. The suit was based on an explicitly fictional
parody in which the petitioner quoted Falwell as having engaged in "a
drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse., 5 4
Overturning the award, the Court ruled that a public figure like Falwell55
could recover for IED in such circumstances only by demonstrating that
the defendant had made a false statement of fact about that figure with
56
actual malice. Thus, the Court not only introduced the actual malice
standard to IED doctrine, but also injected libel's requirement of a false
statement of fact into a tort that had not included this element."
48. Id. at 379 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 387-88.
50. Id.
51. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 32-35.
52. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
53. Id. at 47.
54. Id. at 48.
55. See id. at 57 ("[I]t is clear that respondent Falwell is a 'public figure' for
purposes of First Amendment law.").
56. Id. at 56.
57. See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (Mass.
1976) (stating that a person commits IED when he or she: (1) intends to inflict
emotional distress or knew or should have known that emotional distress was the
probable result of such conduct; (2) acts in an "extreme and outrageous" manner,
carries out actions that are "beyond all possible bounds of decency," or acts in a
manner that is "utterly intolerable in a civilized community;" (3) causes emotional
distress to the plaintiff; and (4) the emotional distress is "severe" and of a nature that
456 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 12
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Moreover, Falwell laid the foundation for Snyder v. Phelps, a decision
that further cabined the reach of IIED claims. There, the Court
overturned a damages award for IED against individuals who had
displayed harsh messages near the funeral of a soldier killed in the line of
duty.5 9 Crucial to the Court's decision was its determination that the
picketing amounted to commentary on matters of public concem60-thus
echoing Hill as well as Falwell.
III. UNDERLYING IMPLICATIONS OF THE SULLIVAN STANDARD'S
DEVIATION FROM ITS SOURCE
A champion of free speech might dismiss doubts about the far-
reaching extension of Sullivan's standard as doctrinal quibbling at odds
with this fundamental right. Somewhat paradoxically, however,
indiscriminate recognition of speech claims may ultimately redound to
the disadvantage of expression. Moreover, transplanting a standard like
the actual malice rule to settings with attenuated links to the standard's
original rationale can promote a kind of First Amendment formalism in
which countervailing values are underserved.
One way in which doctrinal overreaching in the protection of
speech can threaten expression is by provoking a backlash against the
perceived excess. A famous illustration of this dynamic from a separate
constitutional realm is the rise and collapse of the Lochner era.61 After
decades of overriding legislative social and economic policy under the
62 6
aegis of substantive due process, the Court abruptly retreated6 and
"no reasonable person could be expected to endure it") (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
58. _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
59. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. The signs ascribed the deaths of American
soldiers to God's wrath for America's tolerance of homosexuality, especially in the
military. See id at, 131 S. Ct. at 1213-14.
60. See id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 1219 ("Given that Westboro's speech was at a
public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to 'special
protection' under the First Amendment.").
61. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down state's limitation
on bakers' work hours).
62. For an overview of this period, see Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1383 (2001).
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effectively "abdicated" serious review of assertions of substantive
economic rights. It is not difficult to envision, too, a reaction against
the immunity for libel afforded by the actual malice rule to push the
pendulum far in the other direction. Indeed, Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet
may eventually represent the first major steps in such a development.
The Gertz Court objected to the Rosenbloom plurality's position that
private plaintiffs involved in any matter of public or general concern or
interest should be subjected to the actual malice requirement.6 5 Imposing
this constitutional burden abridged "to a degree that we find
unacceptable" states' ability to provide remedies for private figures
66
harmed by defamatory falsehoods. Dun & Bradstreet went so far as to
retroactively describe Gertz's limitation on presumed and punitive
damages as confined to defamatory speech on matters of public
concern.68 Moreover, this characterization of Gertz paved the way for
still further retrenchment of First Amendment safeguards for libel; if
Gertz's ruling applies only to expression on matters of public concern,
then perhaps private figures suing over defamation on matters of private
69
concern are not bound by Gertz's requirement of fault.
63. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding
state's minimum wage for women); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)
(sustaining state mechanism for setting minimum and maximum retail prices for
milk).
64. Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 34, 38; see, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("[C]ourts do not substitute their social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.").
65. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
66. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346.
67. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 785,
n.1 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("One searches Gertz in vain for a single word to
support the proposition that limits on presumed and punitive damages obtained only
when speech involved matters of public concern. Gertz could not have been
grounded in such a premise. Distrust of placing in the courts the power to decide
what speech was of public concern was precisely the rationale . . .
68. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
69. See Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities ofLitigation: Setting
the Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226, 227 n.1 (1985) (discussing strict liability
in such situations after Dun & Bradstreet); Don Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, and Speech on
Matters ofPublic Concern: New Direction in First Amendment Defamation Law, 20
IND. L. REV. 767, 774-75 (1987) (also discussing strict liability).
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Additionally, extension of the actual malice standard into
settings less compelling than that of Sullivan risks diminishing the force
of the requirement itself. As Vincent Blasi observed nearly three decades
ago, the most powerful First Amendment protection should be shaped to
cope with those periods when unpopular views are most vulnerable to
suppression.7 0 In a similar vein, uncritical application of the actual
malice rule may foster a conception of the requirement less sturdy than
the robust protection contemplated by Sullivan.7 1 Much as overuse of
antibiotics can compromise their effectiveness,72 the potency of the
actual malice standard may be compromised if it is not reserved for
conditions where it is most needed to vindicate core First Amendment
values.
Finally, the possibility of unduly constraining government when
a First Amendment doctrine becomes unmoored from its origins can be
discerned in recent Court decisions. A leading example is the holding in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission73 that because political
spending is a form of protected speech, corporations and unions are free
to spend money to support individual candidates during elections.74 A
number of scholars have charged that the Court applied the principle of
vigorous protection of political speech in an artificial way that
undermined democracy rather than advancing it.75 The Court's decision
in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.76 has faced a comparable critique. There,
the Court struck down a state law forbidding the sale of "prescriber-
identifiable information" by pharmacies to data-mining companies, and
70. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985).
71. The Court has expressed a similar concern with respect to commercial
speech. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("To require
a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.").
72. See C.A. Hart, Antibiotics Resistance: An Increasing Problem?, 316(7140)
BRIT. MED. J. 1255, 1255-56 (1998), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMCI 113024/.
73. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
74. Id. at 363-66.
75. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, On Dejudcializing American Campaign
Finance Law, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 887 (2011).
76. - U.S. _,131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
459
by data-mining companies to pharmaceutical companies, "for marketing
or promoting a prescription drug." 7 7 To critics, the Sorrell Court
invalidated a legitimate effort to curb dangerous marketing practices,
invoking a concept of content discrimination with scant relation to the
78
aim of the Court's foundational commercial speech decision to ensure
the free flow of accurate commercial information to consumers. 79 The
Court's actual malice project is likewise open to the objection that
abstraction of this concept from its source has overly impeded legitimate
state interests in protecting citizens' reputations and emotional well-
beings.
IV. CONCLUSION
The application of the actual malice standard to settings beyond
its rationale in Sullivan points to the unavoidable complexity of First
Amendment doctrine. For the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom
of speech to have substance, the Court must interpose shields against
government attempts to stifle expression. At the same time, unless the
phrase "no law, is to assume an unworkable literal sense, First
Amendment standards must be fashioned in each instance to take proper
account of other interests and principles at stake. The varied extension of
the actual malice requirement raises the question of whether the Court
has employed a familiar but blunt instrument when a more finely adapted
tool would have been appropriate.
77. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 463 1(d) (2011). The statute provided an exception
where prescribers had granted their express consent for such sale of this information.
Id.
78. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down state's ban on advertising prescription drug prices).
79. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, "A Necessary Cost of Freedom"? The
Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REv. 1 (2012).
80. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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